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Workers' Compensation
by H. Michael Bagley*
Daniel C. Kniffen*
John G. Blackmon, Jr.***
and
Phillip Comer Griffeth*...
I.

INTRODUCTION

This survey period again saw the introduction of a package of
amendments to the Workers' Compensation Act (the "Act") steered
through the legislative process by the Chairman of the State Board of
Workers' Compensation (the "State Board") and his advisory committee.
Though not as dramatic as in past years, subtle changes could have
significant impact. The bulk of the amendments arose out of the Board's
increasing concern about fraud and abuse in the state's workers'
compensation system. Meanwhile, the state's appellate courts continued
to tackle the complex issues surrounding compensability of heart attack
and psychological injury claims. For the most part, the exclusive remedy
doctrine, which bars a tort action for work-related injuries, withstood its
increasing assaults.
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University (B.A., 1977); University of Georgia (J.D., 1980). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
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(B.A., magna cum laude, 1981; J.D., cum laude, 1984). Member, Mercer Law Review (19821984); Editor in Chief (1983-1984). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
*** Partner in the firm of Drew, Ecki & Farnham, Atlanta, Georgia. The Citadel (B.S.,
1976); Mercer University (J.D., cum laude, 1986). Member, Mercer Law Review (19841986). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
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LEGISLATIVE CHANGES

The General Assembly continued the trend for this decade by again
effecting several substantive changes to the Act in 1995.' Effective July
1, 1995, except where specifically designated retroactive, these amendments to the Act were the second consecutive package designed and
sponsored by the Chairman of the State Board of Workers' Compensation, Harrill L. Dawkins.2
A.

Limitation on Corporate Officer Exemptions
Section 34-9-2.1 of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated ("O.C.G.A.")
has provided a mechanism for corporate officers to elect to be exempted
from coverage under the Workers' Compensation Act.3 Since its
enactment in 1982, there have been no limits on the number of officers
that could be exempted from coverage.4 This unlimited avenue of
corporate exemption was potentially problematic since it provided the
mechanism for an employer to avoid Workers' Compensation coverage for
all employees by deeming them "corporate officers,"5 solely for the
purpose of exempting them from the Workers' Compensation Act.
Seeking to place reasonable limits on what had heretofore been an
unlimited exemption for corporate officers, O.C.G.A. section 34-9-2.1(a)
was amended in 1995.6 The exemption was limited to no more than five
corporate officers, and in order for the written certification of exemption
to be in effect,7 the corporate officer must be identified by name, as well
as by the office held at the time of certification.'

B. Modification of Subrogation Procedures
Subrogation was one of the most controversial elements of the
sweeping legislative changes enacted in 1992,' and the area has

1. O.C.G.A. §§ 34-9-1 to -421 (Supp. 1995).
2. All changes became effective on July 1, 1995 in coruunction with numerous changes
to Board Rules.
3. O.C.G.A. § 34-9-2.1 (Supp. 1995).
4. 1982 Ga. Laws 2360.
5. See O.C.GA. §§ 14-2-840 to -844 (1994).

6. Id. § 34-9-2.1 (Supp. 1995).
7. Board Rule 2.1 mandates the filing of a Form WC-8 with the workers' compensation
insurance carrier or, in the absence of an insurer, with the Board.

8. O.C.G.A. § 34-9-2.1(aX1)-(2) (Supp. 1995).
9. See H. Michael Bagley, Daniel C. Kniffen & John G. Blackmon, Jr., Workers'
Compensation, 44 MERCER L. REV. 457, 465 (1992).
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continued to be fraught with controversy and confusion.'0 The General
Assembly made an effort to modify two aspects of the subrogation
provisions to make the process of subrogation more workable.
It was not clear from re-enactment of subrogation in 1992 whether or
not death benefits would be recoverable by an employer in a subrogation
action." In Bankhead v. Lucas Aerospace Ltd., 2 the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Georgia held that the
subrogation statute would not allow an employer to recover for death
benefits."3 The court reasoned that death benefits were simply not
among those enumerated in O.C.G.A. section 34-9-11.1.14 Therefore,
the employer had no right of subrogation for death benefits. 5 The
General Assembly amended the list of payments made by an employer
which are subject to recovery via subrogation in 1995 by inserting "death
benefits" among the types of payments that are recoverable."6
There has also been much controversy over the automatic assignment
of the injured employee's cause of action to the employer after one year
from the date of injury." In Bennett v. Williams Electrical Construction Co., 8 the court of appeals held that the assignment was automatic
and complete. 9 This created a number of unanticipated problems for
employers who suddenly found themselves confronted with the possibili-

10. In Maryland Casualty Ins. Co. v. Glomski, 210 Ga. App. 759,437 S.E.2d 616 (1993),
the court determined that O.C.G.A. § 34-9-11.1 did not apply retroactively and only applied
to injuries occurring on or after that statute's effective date, July 1, 1992. 210 Ga. App.
at 761, 437 S.E.2d at 618. But see Moore v. Savannah Cocoa, Inc., 217 Ga. App. 869, 459

S.E.2d 580 (1995) (statutory amendment could be applied retroactively); see also Draughn
v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 218 Ga. App. 540, 462 S.E.2d 445 (1995). For further reading on the

impact of the workers' compensation subrogation statute, see Hugh C. Wood, "Plaintiff/Claimant's Perspective of O.C.G.A. § 34-9.11.1," paper delivered January 16, 1995;
Michael S. Reeves, "Defendant's Perspective of Workers' Compensation Subrogation," paper

delivered January 16, 1995 (both papers provide an extensive review of cases or papers
which have cited or discussed the statute) and Hugh C. Wood, "Unintended Mischief
Created By the New Workers' Compensation Assignment Statute O.C.G.A. § 34-9-11.1," 31
GA. ST. B.J. 3 (Spring 1995), at 140-48.
11. See Bagley et al, supra note 9, at 465 ("the language leaves unanswered the
question of whether the subrogation provision includes rehabilitation expenses, death
benefits, or survivors' benefits.").
12.

878 F. Supp. 221 (N.D. Ga. 1994).

13. Id. at 222.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 223.
16.
17.
18.
19.

O.C.G.A. § 34-9-11.1(b) (Supp. 1995).
See id. § 34-9-11.1(c) (1992).
215 Ga. App. 423, 450 S.E.2d 873 (1994).
Id. at 424, 450 S.E.2d at 875.
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ty of tort claims by employees based upon the employer's failure to
assert rights on behalf of the employee against the third-party tortfeasor.
O.C.G.A. section 34-9-11.1(c) was amended in 1995 to modify the
absolute assignment from the employee to the employer and to create,
in its stead, a partial assignment.20 One year after the work-related
injury, the employer and employee will jointly hold the right of action
against any third-party tortfeasor.2" Furthermore, while the employer
or its insurer may intervene in any action to protect and enforce its
subrogation lien, the statute
specifies that neither the employer nor
22
insurer is required to do so.
Although the modification to include death benefits within payments
recoverable by subrogation was not retroactive and will take effect on
July 1, 1995, the General Assembly attempted to rectify all of the
assignment problems that developed as a result of the re-enactment of
subrogation in 1992 by making the 1995 corrective language retroactive. 23 The retroactive modification of what is apparently a substantive
right under Georgia's Workers' Compensation Act has previously
survived constitutional challenges.2 4 Moreover, the retroactive modification of workers' compensation subrogation rights has been upheld in
other states.25
C.

Enhancement of Civil and Criminal Penalties

The Board has long possessed the authority to assess penalties for
failure to follow directives, for making false or misleading statements,
or for failure to comply with the insurance requirements of the Act. 6
The magnitude of the penalties was increased in 1995 from a range of
$500 to $5,000 to a range of $1,000 to $10,000 for intentionally making
false or misleading statements or representations for the purpose of
obtaining or denying any benefit or payment under the Act. 27 The

O.C.G.A.
21. Id.
22. Id.
20.

§ 34-9-11.1(c) (Supp. 1995).

23. See id. § 34-9-11.1(e).
24. In Canton Textile Mills v. Lathem, 253 Ga. 102,317 S.E.2d 189 (1984), the supreme
court found that the retroactive modification of the statute of limitations in byssinosis cases
under O.C.G.A. § 34-9-281 was not unconstitutional. 253 Ga. at 105, 317 S.E.2d at 193.
25. In a state facing a similar "re-assignment problem," the Arizona legislature
remedied the problem by modifying the statute to allow for re-assignment. See ARiz. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 23-1023(B). The fact that it did so retroactively was upheld. Stirewalt v.
P.P.G. Indus., Inc., 674 P.2d 320, 323 (Ariz. 1984) (the legislation affected remedial matters
not substantive rights).
26. O.C.G.A. § 34-9-18 (1978).
27. Id. § 34-9-18(b) (Supp. 1995).
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penalty may be further enhanced with the assessment of the cost of
collection against the offending party.2" Note that the new provision
in O.C.G.A. section 34-9-18(f) directs that the payment of any penalties
be made to the General Fund of the State of Georgia, rather than to the
Subsequent Injury Trust Fund.29
Likewise, while criminal sanctions remain a misdemeanor punishable
by incarceration of up to one year, 0 the potential fine imposed upon a
finding of guilt for intentionally making a false or misleading statement
or representation for the purpose of facilitating the obtaining or denying
of any benefit or payment under the Act was increased from a range of
$500 to $5,000 to a range of $1,000 and to $10,000 per violation, as well
as the assessment of the costs of investigation and prosecution.31
D. Creation of Fraudand Compliance Unit
A new code section, O.C.G.A. section 34-9-24, was added to provide for
the establishment of an office within the State Board of Workers'
Compensation that will be known as the "Fraud and Compliance
Unit."32 This unit is designed by statute to assist the Chairman of the
State Board in investigating allegations of fraud and non-compliance as
well as developing and implementing programs to prevent fraud and
abuse. 3 While the unit itself will have no prosecutorial authority, the
unit is required by statute to promptly notify the appropriate prosecut34
ing attorney's office of any action which involves criminal activity.
This new code section also contains an immunity provision which should
protect any employee or agent of the Board in the execution of their
activities in this unit against civil liability for libel, slander, or any other
relevant tort. 5
E. Workers' Compensation Truth in Advertising Act of 1995
Following the lead of several other states, including California,3 6 the
General Assembly adopted what shall be known as the Workers'
Compensation Truth in Advertising Act of 1995 and codified the

28. Id. § 34-9-18(e).
29. Id. § 34-9-18(f).
30. Id. § 34-9-19 (1973).
31. Id. § 34-9-19.
32. Id. § 34-9-24.
33. Id.
34. Id. § 34-9-24(a).
35. Id. § 34-9-24(b).
36. Workers' Compensation Truth in Advertising Act of 1992, CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 54305434 (West 1995).
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provisions at O.C.G.A. sections 34-9-30 through 34-9-32. 37 The stated
purpose of the Act is "to assure truth and adequate disclosure of all
material and relevant information in advertising which solicits persons
to engage or consult an attorney or a medical care provider for the
purpose of asserting a workers' compensation claim."" The provisions
apply only to "television advertisement, with broadcast originating in
this state, which solicits persons to file workers' compensation claims or
to engage or consult an attorney, a medical care provider, or clinic for
the purpose of giving consideration to a workers' compensation claim or
to market workers' compensation insurance coverage. .

. ."

Note that

this provision applies not only to attorneys and medical providers, but
also to any entity that seeks to "market workers' compensation insurance
40
coverage."
In any of these circumstances, the Act requires the following notice in
Roman font boldface thirty-six point type: 'Willfully making a false or
misleading statement or representation to obtain or deny workers'
compensation benefits is a crime carrying a penalty of imprisonment
and/or a fine of up to $10,000.00."41 Anyone violating this provision
is
42
subject to a fine of between $1,000 and $10,000 for each violation.
F

Empowering the Board to Force Participationin Mediation
The implementation of broad-based mediation has been one of the
most significant developments in the last two years. However, the Board
was technically without the legal authority to force mediation. O.C.G.A.
section 34-9-100, relating to the Board's powers, has been modified to
empower the Board to force mediation under the supervision and
guidance of the Board.43
G. Renewing the Admissibility of Medical Records
One of the features of the Workers' Compensation Act that avoided
undue expense and burden was the hearsay exception for medical
reports embodied in O.C.G.A. section 34-9-102(e)(2). 44 This exemption
saved a substantial amount of time and money by avoiding the necessity
of either deposing medical practitioners or subpoenaing them to the

37. O.C.G.A. §§ 34-9-30 to -32 (Supp. 1995).
38. Id. § 34-9-30(b).

39. Id. § 34-9-31.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. § 34-9-32(a).
43. Id. § 34-9-100(b).
44. Id. § 34-9-102(e)(2) (1992).
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hearing. While this provision had been in existence for two decades, the
court of appeals drew into question whether anything other than actual
signed office notes would be admissible in Georgia Power Co. v.
Leonard.45 The decision in Leonard made it virtually impossible to use
letters or notes from physicians, including letters or notes which
commented specifically on an employee's ability to do certain forms of
light-duty work or normal-duty work.46
O.C.G.A. section 34-9-102(e)(2) has been modified to overcome this
problem by applying the hearsay exception to any "document" which
contains an "opinion relevant to any medical issue,"47 and the modification is specifically applied retroactively as well as prospectively. 8 This
should allow the return to our normal practice in the utilization of
medical documentation without the necessity of a deposition or the
subpoena of medical providers to hearings. This amendment is
retroactive since it is clearly procedural.
H.

Modifying the Definition of CatastrophicInjury
The definition of catastrophic injury became extremely important with
the 1992 reform legislation that imposed a 400-week cap,49 deleted the
requirement for mandatory vocational rehabilitation, ° and allowed a
shift to temporary partial disability benefits after fifty-two consecutive
or seventy-eight aggregate weeks of release to work with limitations,51
all in noncatastrophic cases.52 The proverbial "safety-net" definition in
the list of catastrophic injuries relied heavily upon determinations of
disability that were imposed by the Social Security Administration."
A great deal of debate ensued over whether or not determinations by
the Social Security Administration would be binding in a workers'
compensation proceeding. The claimant's bar desired to have all
individuals receiving Social Security Disability Income ("SSDI") benefits
automatically categorized as catastrophic for purposes of workers'
compensation. However, from a technical standpoint, the requirements

45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

215 Ga. App. 383, 451 S.E.2d 74 (1994).
Id. at 384, 451 S.E.2d at 75.
O.C.G.A. § 34-9-102(eX2) (Supp. 1995).
Id.
O.C.G.A. § 34-9-261 (1992).
Id. § 34-9-200.1.
Id. § 34-9-240.
See supra notes 49-51.

53. O.C.G.A. § 34-9-200.1(g)(6) (1992).
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I
in Georgia law related
to collateral estoppel would appear to bar such an
argument."
In an effort to avoid the onslaught of coming litigation over this issue,
the catch-all definition found at O.C.G.A. section 34-9-200.1(g)(6) has
been modified to read as follows:
Any other injury of a nature and severity that prevents the employee
from being able to perform his or her prior work or any work available
in substantial numbers within the national economy. A decision
granting or denying disability income benefits under Title II or
supplemental security income benefits under Title XVI of the Social
Security Act shall be admissible in evidence and the board shall give
the evidence the consideration and deference due under the circumstances regarding the issue of whether the injury is a catastrophic
injury.5

Note that the definition in the first sentence of this paragraph is in
essence the social security criteria. 6 However, it allows the State
Board of Workers' Compensation to apply the social security criteria for
total disability rather than creating an argument that the State Board
is limited to following the determination made by the Social Security
Administration as a result of a proceeding where all parties to the
workers' compensation claim would not have been present. It also
facilitates acknowledgment of the Social Security Administration's
determination without making that determination binding on the parties
in the workers' compensation proceeding.
The Social Security Administration's determinations will be a twoedged sword. They will be admissible when the Social Security
Administration determines that the person is not totally disabled to the
same extent that they will be admissible to argue that the claimant is
totally disabled and meets the criteria for disability income benefits
under the Social Security Act.
I. Penalty for Late Payment of Medical Expenses
It has long been the Board's practice to assess penalties for the late
payment of medical expenses. This was imposed through Board Rule,
but a strict analysis of the Workers' Compensation Act failed to reveal
54. See generally Ervin v. Swift Adhesives, Inc., 208 Ga. App. 265, 430 S.E.2d 133
(1993); McFadden Business Publications, Inc. v. Guidry, 177 Ga. App. 885, 341 S.E.2d 294
(1986) (collateral estoppel doctrine applicable to hearings of State Board of Workers'
Compensation). The SSDI proceeding would likely not comply because the employer is not
a party to that proceeding.
55. O.C.G.A. § 34-9-200.1(g)(6) (Supp. 1995).
56. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1382(a03)(A), (B)(1994).
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any legislative authority for this penalty. O.C.G.A. section 34-9-203 has
been modified to empower the Board with authority to impose penalties
for late payment of reasonable medical charges, but only in specific
circumstances.57 That code section reads as follows:
The board may, in its discretion, assess a penalty of up to 20 percent
of reasonable medical charges not paid within 60 days from the date
that the employer or the employer's workers' compensation insurance
carrier receives the charges and reports required by the board, where
there has been compliance with the requirements of law and board
rules. Said penalty shall be payable to the medical provider."
If the medical expenses are received along with the appropriate Board
forms,5" then payment of the charges as adjusted in accordance with
the fee schedule60 must be made within sixty days to avoid up to a
twenty percent penalty.6 1 Unlike other penalties within the Act, the
amount of this penalty is discretionary with a maximum of twenty
percent and is not automatic.6 2
J.

Alien Dependent Death Benefits
O.C.G.A. section 34-9-265 is one of the provisions in the Workers'
Compensation Act that addresses the entitlement of dependents to
benefits upon the death of an employee injured in a work-related
injury." That code section has long differentiated between dependents
who are citizensof the United States or Canada and dependents who are
not.64 This issue has been controversial and was specifically addressed
in Barge-Wagener Construction Co. v. Morales, 5 when the court of
appeals held that the differentiation was not unconstitutional. 6
However,the General Assembly has now deleted paragraph five of
O.C.G.A. section 34-9-265(b), entitling non-resident aliens of the United
States or Canada to the same dependency benefits upon the death of an
injured employee as all other dependents.6 The issue of citizenship

57.

O.C.G.A. § 34-9-203(c) (Supp. 1995).

58. Id.
59. Board Rule 205.
60. Board Rule 203.
61.

O.C.G.A. § 34-9-203(c) (Supp. 1995).

62. Id.
63. Id. § 34-9-265.
64. Id. § 34-9-265(b)(5) (1992).

65. 263 Ga. 190, 429 S.E.2d 671 (1993).
66. Id. at 192, 429 S.E.2d at 673.
67. O.C.G.A. § 34-9-265 (Supp. 1995).
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and residency is no longer relevant for purposes of analyzing entitlement
to death benefits.
SITF Receives No Payment Upon Death With No Dependents
Consistent with the provision directing the payment of all fines and
penalties to the General Treasury, O.C.G.A. section 34-9-265(0 has been
amended to direct the payment of $10,000 in instances of no dependency
after death to the General Fund of the State Treasury rather than to the
Subsequent Injury Trust Fund. 8

K

Temporary or Leased Employees
While not a part of the legislative package submitted by the Chairman
of the State Board of Workers' Compensation, the exclusive remedy
doctrine's application to leased and temporary employee situations was
specifically addressed by the addition of O.C.G.A. section 34-9-11(c),
which reads as follows:

L.

The immunity provided by this subsection shall apply and extend to
the businesses using the services of a temporary help contracting firm,
as such term is defined in Code Section 34-8-46, or an employee leasing
company, as such term is defined in Code Section 34-8-32, when the
benefits required by this chapter are provided by either the temporary
help contracting firm or the employee leasing company or the business
using the services of either such firm or company. A temporary help
contracting firm or an employee leasing company shall be deemed to
be a statutory employer for the purposes of this chapter.69
In the leased employee or temporary employee situation, this would
seem to remove the necessity of engaging in a "borrowed servant"
analysis,7" since there is no longer any requirement that the substitute
employer have the right to terminate the employee's services. The mere
presence of a leased employee or temporary employee situation, coupled
with one of the parties involved in providing workers' compensation
coverage, will extend the exclusive remedy to all entities involved.7
However, deeming the otherwise borrowed servant to be a "statutory

68. Id. § 34-9-265(f) (Supp. 1995); see also O.C.G.A. § 34-9-358 (Supp. 1995) (which has

been amended to delete the SITF's entitlement to these funds).
69. O.C.G.A. § 34-9-11(c) (Supp. 1995).
70. See Sheets v. J.H. Heath Tree Serv., Inc., 193 Ga. App. 278,387 S.E.2d 155 (1989);
Six Flags Over Georgia v. Hill, 247 Ga. 375, 276 S.E.2d 572 (1981).
71. O.C.G.A. § 34-9-11 (Supp. 1995).
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employee" 2 of the company could create some exposure in tort for
actions brought against co-employees of the leasing company.73
M. Employees of the Atlanta Committee for the Olympic Games
The General Assembly enacted O.C.G.A. section 34-9-2.4, 7" which
specifically provides that any person who performs voluntary service
without pay for the Atlanta Committee for the Olympic Games or for the
Atlanta Para-Olympic Organizing Committee shall be deemed an
employee of the organization for purposes of workers' compensation
while performing such service.75 This provision will sunset on December 31, 1997.76
III.

HEART ATTACK CLAIMS

Heart attack claims have always been among the most difficult types
of workers' compensation cases to analyze. Since the court of appeals
decision in A & P Transportationv. Warren,77 which was reported in
last year's survey article, 78 there has been much debate among practitioners concerning whether the law in this area has expanded to create
a greater scope of recovery.
The two cases issued during the survey period do not build upon the
decision in Warren, but illustrate how fact-sensitive these cases are, and
how unwilling Georgia's appellate courts have been to establish brightline tests for recovery. With the controversy surrounding heart attack
79
claims, and the efforts to amend the so-called "heart attack statute,"
this portion of the article will briefly review how the law has developed

regarding heart attack claims and analyze the particular tensions that
affect these cases.
A

The "HeartAttack Statute"

Before 1963, Georgia's workers' compensation statute dealt with heart
attack claims as with any other type of injury, meaning that to be
compensable the claimant's heart condition must have been shown by a
preponderance of the evidence to "arise out of and in the course of

72. See id § 34-9-8.
73. See Rothrock v. Jeter, 212 Ga. App. 85, 441 S.E.2d 88 (1994).
74. 1995 Ga. Laws 852.
75. O.C.G.A. § 34-9-2.4(a) (Supp. 1995).
76. Id. § 34-9-2.4(b).
77. 213 Ga. App. 60, 443 S.E.2d 857 (1994).
78. See H. Michael Bagley, Daniel C. Kniffen & John G. Blackmon, Jr., Workers'
Compensation, 46 MERCER L. REv. 566 (1994).
79. O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1(4) (1994).
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employment."" With the advancement of medical science, however,
and the understanding that heart attacks are almost always the end
result of a prolonged disease process known as atherosclerosis, the
legislature acted in 1963 to exclude from the definition of "injury" under
the Workers' Compensation Act: "Heart disease, heart attack, the
failure or occlusion of any of the coronary blood vessels, or thrombosis,
unless it is shown by preponderance of competent and creditable
evidence that it was attributable to the performance of the usual work
of employment."8 '
This amendment to the Workers' Compensation Act has remained in
this form, with only grammatical changes, since its inception. From its
wording, the statute appears to place a higher burden of proof on the
claimant to recover for a heart attack, since the statute requires proof
by "preponderance of competent and credible evidence," rather than the
standard proof by simple preponderance of the evidence. 2 Moreover,
the Legislature obviously would not see fit to exclude heart attacks and
heart disease from the definition of injury under the Workers' Compensation Act except under certain circumstances if it did not intend a
somewhat higher burden of proof in such cases. In interpreting the
statute over the last thirty years, however, neither the Georgia Supreme
Court nor the Georgia Court of Appeals has applied this statute
restrictively. To the contrary, the courts have uniformly interpreted the
statute as placing broad discretion with the State Board of Workers'
Compensation to determine the compensability of heart attack claims. 3
B. Sources of Evidence: Medical Opinion, Lay Observation, and the
"NaturalInference Through Human Experience"
Even before the 1963 amendment, Georgia courts recognized three
forms of evidence from which the trier of fact could determine whether
or not a heart attack is work-related: (1) medical opinion, (2) lay
observation and opinion, and (3) the "natural inference through human
experience."84

With the passage of the heart attack statute, Georgia courts continued
to emphasize these three sources of evidence as the focus for determining
whether a heart attack is compensable under the Workers' Compensa-

80. Thompson-Weinman Co. v. Yancey, 90 Ga. App. 213, 82 S.E.2d 725 (1954);

Maryland Casualty Co. v. Dixon, 83 Ga. App. 172, 63 S.E.2d 272 (1951).
81. GA. CODE ANN. § 114-1.02 (1963), now codified at O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1(4).
82. O.C.G.A. § 24-1-1(5) (1863).

83. See A & P Transp. v. Warren, 213 Ga. App. 60, 443 S.E.2d 857 (1994).
84. See McDaniel v. Employers' Mutual Liab. Ins. Co., 104 Ga. App. 340, 343, 121
S.E.2d 801, 804 (1961).
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tion Act. The history of the heart attack statute, and the first fifteen
years of its interpretation, is well summarized in the 1978 supreme court
case, Guye v. Home Indemnity Co. 5 In reviewing the body of case law
that developed following the 1963 amendment, the supreme court noted:
It is well recognized in "heart attack" cases that it is often difficult for
the trier of fact to find the line between a noncompensable heart injury
that is a symptom of an existing disease merely manifested during job
exertion, and a compensable heart injury to which the job exertion was
a contributing precipitating factor ....

The generalized and complex

nature of a heart injury may prevent causation from being conclusively
attributed to the work performed.'
In Guye, therefore, the supreme court identified the dividing line that is
ultimately the source of all tension in heart attack claims: determining
when the pre-existing disease process stops and work-related causation
begins.
In Guye, the supreme court was called upon to address whether the
1963 statute prohibited a finding of compensability based upon "natural
inference" alone." Rather than interpreting the statute as establishing
bright-line rules, the court concluded that "whatever the effect of the
1963 amendment, its impact was primarily if not exclusively directed to
the trier of fact in workmen's 'compensation cases." s
The court
therefore held that determinations of compensability can be made
strictly upon the natural inference from the evidence alone, where the
medical evidence offered is in conflict.8 9
C. The Elusive Boundariesof Compensability
With the rule in Guye that the heart attack statute is designed
primarily as a guide for the finder of fact, subsequent decisions have
established few boundaries for the compensability of heart attack claims,
and have tended to focus upon whether there was sufficient evidence to
support the Board's decision under the "any evidence" standard of
review.90 Two exceptions are that the natural inference rule may not

85. 241 Ga. 213, 244 S.E.2d 864 (1978).
86. Id. at 215, 244 S.E.2d at 866.
87. Id.
88, Id.
89. Id. at 217, 244 S.E.2d at 867. The court specifically declined to consider whether
the "natural inference" rule could be utilized where the medical evidence was uncontradicted that the heart attack was not work-related, thereby failing to resolve a conflict that
remains to this day. See Thomas v. U. S. Casualty Co., 218 Ga. 493, 128 S.E.2d 749 (1962).
90. Generally, decisions of the State Board of Workers' Compensation must be affirmed
on appeal if there is "any evidence" to support them. Howard Sheppard, Inc. v. McGowan,
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be utilized to find a heart attack compensable where the first symptoms
of the attack occur at a time when the employee is not engaged in the
employer's business,91 and that mere symptoms of the underlying heart
disease, such as angina pectoris, are not compensable. 2 Most cases,
however, have steadily expanded the scope of the heart attack statute.
For example, in Zippy Mart, Inc. v. Fender,8 a claimant's coronary
bypass operation was found to be a compensable "accident" arising out
of and in the course of his employment because of evidence that the
claimant's stress at work accelerated or perhaps even caused his
underlying heart disease. An award of benefits was also upheld even
though the exact date of the claimant's heart attack could not be
medically determined, given other evidence that the claimant's work was
physically and emotionally stressful and that she experienced severe
chest pain while at work. 4 Medical testimony that the claimant's
work-connected emotional stress "might or could have contributed"95 to
his heart attack was sufficient to support an award of benefits.9"
Against this backdrop, the decision in A & P Transportationv. Warren,97 is little more than a continuation of the court's unwillingness to
utilize the requirements of the heart attack statute as a means of
imposing distinct boundaries of compensability for heart attack claims.
In Warren, the theory of recovery was that the claimant's work as a
long-haul truck driver contributed, at least in part, to his development
of atherosclerotic heart disease because his work made it difficult for
him to exercise on any regular basis or to obtain healthy, low-cholesterol
food.9" The court of appeals was badly split in the decision in Warren 99 and again struggled with upholding a causal relationship to the
claimant's employment (which entailed lack of exercise and poor
nutrition) that even the majority recognized "constitutes a hazard to
which people are exposed apart from employment."" 9 Ultimately,

137 Ga. App. 408, 224 S.E.2d 65 (1976).
91. Southwire Co. v. Cato, 250 Ga. 895, 302 S.E.2d 91 (1983).
92. Carter v. Kansas City Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 138 Ga. App. 601, 226 S.E.2d 755
(1976).
93. 170 Ga. App. 617, 317 S.E.2d 575 (1984).
94. Southwire Co. v. Eason, 181 Ga. App. 708, 353 S.E.2d 567 (1987).
95. City Council of Augusta v. Williams, 137 Ga. App. 177, 178, 223 S.E.2d 227, 228
(1976).
96. Id.
97. 213 Ga. App. 60, 443 S.E.2d 857 (1994).
98. Id. at 61, 443 S.E.2d at 859.
99. Id. at 64, 443 S.E.2d at 860-61. (Indeed, the original majority opinion was in favor
of denying the claim, but the court reversed itself upon motion for reconsideration.).
100.. Id., 443 S.E.2d at 860.
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however, the majority of the court determined not to interfere with the
fact-finding authority of the State Board.
The case of Sutton v. B & L Express"0 ' provides an interesting
contrast to the decision in Warren, in that like Warren, Sutton was a
long-haul truck driver who began to feel sick while completing his
delivery and was subsequently diagnosed as suffering a heart attack. 0 2 Unlike Warren, however, the State Board denied benefits,
finding that the claimant's heart attack was the result of multiple, nonwork-related risk factors for coronary disease, including hypertension,
cigarette abuse, and obesity."° It was further noted that the claimant's physician testified only that stress from the claimant's job could
have been a causative factor in his heart attack, but did not reach any
conclusions on this point."° While presumably the Board could have
found in favor of the claimant on this evidence, the court of appeals
upheld the denial of the benefits, holding that the evidence in the record
was sufficient for the Board to find no causal relationship and in fact
With very similar facts,
cited the decision in Warren as authority."
therefore, completely opposite results were achieved and affirmed in
Warren and Sutton.
Similarly, in Sewell v. Bill Johnson Motors, Inc.,'06 an award of
benefits was upheld based upon evidence submitted to the State Board
that the claimant's job as a service department manager was stressful
and contributed to his fatal heart attack. Although no autopsy was
performed on the claimant, the testimony of a physician retained to
review the claimant's medical records that job-related stress could have
been the precipitating factor in the claimant's heart attack was
considered competent and credible evidence upon which the Board could
award compensation. 17
Although the cases of Sewell and Sutton do not break any new ground,
they are illustrative of the tensions that exist in defining the compensability of heart attack claims under Georgia's Act."0 Sutton, although
barely distinguishable from Warren on its facts, nevertheless yields a
contrary result, underscoring the lack of consistency which is common

101. 215 Ga. App. 394, 450 S.E.2d 859 (1994).
102. Id. at 395, 450 S.E.2d at 861.
103. Id.
104. Id.

105. Id.
106. 213 Ga. App. 853, 446 S.E.2d 239 (1994).

107. Id. at 853, 446 S.E.2d at 239. '
108. Sewell v. Bill Johnson Motors, Inc., 213 Ga. App. 853, 446 S.E.2d 239; Sutton v.
B. & L. Express, 215 Ga. App. 394, 450 S.E.2d 859.
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place in so-called stress claims. °9 Apart from the fact that there is
substantial medical debate whether emotional stress plays a significant
role in the development of atherosclerotic disease, proving what is, or is
not, stressful to any particular individual is virtually impossible. The
highly subjective, and often times self-serving, nature of testimony
concerning job-related stress makes it all the more difficult to obtain an
accurate gauge for the true causes of an individual heart attack. The
decisions in Sutton and Sewell, like the decision in Warren, are
reminders that until the legislature sees fit to amend the heart attack
statute, heart attack claims will remain extraordinarily fact-sensitive
and, therefore, largely unpredictable.
IV. PSYCHOLOGICAL INJURIES

Perhaps the most controversial decision to come from the survey
period was the case of George v. Southwire Co.,"' which raises disturbing questions concerning the compensability of claims for psychiatric
disability.
George, a truck driver for the Southwire Company, sustained minor
injuries to his right knee, hip, and chest when his truck struck another
vehicle that pulled in front of his."' The female passenger of the other
vehicle was killed instantly, while the driver was seriously injured.
George was taken to the hospital, where he was put in the same room
with the injured driver, who was "gurgling and hollering for the
deceased woman.""' George became so upset that he had to be
removed from the room.
George recovered quickly from his minor physical injuries and was
released to return to work without restriction. When he was asked to
drive again, however, he was mentally unable to do so and was
subsequently diagnosed as suffering from post-traumatic stress
disorder."3 The treating psychiatrist testified that the claimant's posttraumatic stress disorder was primarily caused by what George observed
during the accident, but was intensified and prolonged by his knee
injury, which acted as a recurrent reminder." 4
The Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") found that the claimant's
psychological problems were caused by witnessing the events, and not

109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

215 Ga. App. at 396, 450 S.E.2d at 864.
217 Ga. App. 586, 458 S.E.2d 362 (1995).
Id. at 587, 458 S.E.2d at 362.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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by any of his specific physical traumas."' The ALJ, therefore, denied
the claim for disability based upon the claimant's post-traumatic stress
disorder as not arising from a discernible physical injury 1 6 This
decision was affirmed by the Full Board (now known as the Appellate
Division) and the superior court.
A three judge panel of the court of appeals reversed, finding:
"[alithough this physical injury is not the cause of his mental disability,
it is part of the reason for its continuation.""7 The court's holding is
perplexing for several reasons. First, the statement that the claimant's
physical injuries were both "not the cause of his mental disability" and
yet a "part of the reason for its continuation" would seem to be
contradictory."'
Either the claimant's physical injuries caused the
claimant's mental disability or they did not. Second, the court's
conclusion would appear to be at odds with the well-established any
evidence rule,"9 which provides that findings of fact by the State
Board must be affirmed if there is any evidence to support them. Given
the Board's express finding that the claimant's psychiatric disability
stemmed from his psychic trauma, and not his physical injuries, 2 ° the
court of appeals conclusion that the claimant's physical injuries played
some role in the claimant's psychiatric disability both violates the any
evidence rule and inserts the court of appeals as the finder of fact.
Third, and perhaps of most concern, the court's holding is at odds with
well-established precedent requiring a psychiatric disability to be
directly related to a compensable physical injury and as a result may
spawn increasing litigation over the compensability of so-called stress
claims.'
It has been well-settled in Georgia that, to be compensable
under the Workers' Compensation Act, a claim for psychiatric disability
must be directly related to a discernable physical injury.'22 The court
in George acknowledges this precedent, but cites several older cases for
the proposition that a psychiatric disability is still compensable provided
there is some physical injury involved, even if the physical injury does

115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 588, 458 S&E.2d at 363,
118. Id.
119. See Howard Sheppard, Inc. v. McGowan, 137 Ga. App. 408, 224 S.E.2d 65 (1976).
120. George v. Southwire Co., 217 Ga. App. at 588, 458 S.E.2d at 363.
121. Other jurisdictions have hotly debated the impact of mental stress claims on their
workers' compensation systems. See A. V. Matsumoto, Reforming the Reform: Mental
Stress Claims Under California'sWorkers'CompensationSystem, 27 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1327
(1994).
122. W.W. Fowler Oil Co. v. Hamby, 192 Ga. App. 422, 385 S.E.2d 106 (1989); Hanson
Buick, Inc. v. Chatham, 163 Ga. App. 127, 292 S.E.2d 428 (1982).
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not directly cause the psychiatric disability.'
Such a conclusion
would certainly constitute a change in Georgia law, and is not consistent
with the cases cited by the court.
For example, the court cites Indemnity InsuranceCo. ofNorth America
v. Loftis 12 4 for the proposition that "if a disability exists, whether or
not it is physical or mental, if it is real and is brought on by the accident
and injury, this being a humane law and liberally construed, it is
nevertheless compensable."'2 The decision in Loftis, however, did not
hold that a psychiatric disability from a psychic trauma is compensable.
To the contrary, Loftis involved a claim of psychiatric disability directly
related to a back injury and was reversed only because the administrative law judge made an erroneous placement of the burden of proof' 2
The court in George also cites Howard v. Superior Contractors127 as
analogous in that "claimant George's mental disability was brought on
2
by a compensable accident in which he was physically injured." 1
Quite unlike the facts in George, however, the claimant in Howard was
found to suffer from post-traumatic stress syndrome as a result of the
physical injury sustained in his 225 foot fall from a tower at Three Mile
Island. 129 The decision in Howard, therefore, can hardly be support for
the proposition that a psychiatric disability produced by purely psychic
trauma is compensable.
There is little room for argument that the claimant's psychiatric injury
in George was both legitimate and at least temporarily disabling, and it
may be that the court of appeals decision falls within that well-known
genre of cases in which bad facts make bad law. Yet, George is quite
difficult to align with prior cases and is certainly contrary to the court's
specific comments in Hanson Buick, Inc. v. Chatham:
We do not necessarily agree, however, that the "sophistication and
accuracy of psychiatric diagnoses and treatment" is so very great; nor,
if it were, could it overcome the clear-cut logic and pervasive public
policy underlying the requirement that to be compensable psychological
injury or disease must result "naturally and unavoidably" from some
discernable physical occurrence. Regardless of what other states may
perceive to be reasonable interpretations and functions of their

123. George v. Southwire Co., 217 Ga. App. 586, 458 S.E.2d 362 (1995).

124.
125.
created
applied
126.
127.
128.

103 Ga. App. 749, 120 S.E.2d 655 (1961).
217 Ga. App. at 587-88, 458 S.E.2d at 363. Note also that O.C.G.A. § 34-9-23,
July 1, 1994, provides that "the provisions of this chapter shall be construed and
impartially to both employers and employees."
103 Ga. App. at 751, 120 S.E.2d at 656.
180 Ga. App. 68, 348 S.E.2d 563 (1986).
217 Ga. App. at 588, 458 S.E.2d at 363.

129. Howard v. Superior Contractors, 180 Ga. App. at 68, 348 S.E.2d at 563.
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Workers' Compensation Acts, the allowance of compensation for
psychological disorder arising out of psychological injury, even if it
were easily proved, could make mischief not remotely intended by the
beneficent objectives of our Act.'"0
Certiorari was granted and oral argument was presented to the supreme
court on January 16, 1996. The decision should be interesting in light
of the fact that the chief justice is already on record as opposed to the
long-standing physical injury requirement for claims of psychiatric
disability.13 '
V. CASE LAW DEVELOPMENTS
A.

Accident Arising Out of Employment

When an employee is found dead in a place where he is reasonably
expected to be while in the performance of his job duties, and the cause
of death is unexplained, there may be a presumption that it arose out of
the employment." 2 The law allows for the presumption to assist the
dependents in meeting their burden of proof since the witness to the
incident is unavailable to give testimony regarding the causal connection."
As for causation, it is the "precipitating rather than the
immediate causative factor" which must be unexplained."
If the
precipitating causative factor in the death is known, and explained, then
presumption is unnecessary simply because the question of whether the
death arose out of the employment is capable of being proved by other
objective evidence.'
In Publisher'sCirculationFulfillment, Inc. v. Bailey,13 6 the employee
was found unconscious in his automobile inside the employer's warehouse six minutes after his shift began. The immediate cause of death,
acute carbon monoxide intoxication, was known, but the precipitating
cause was unknown.'37 Thus, the ALJ applied the presumption and,
after doing so, found that the accident arose out of and in the course of

130. Hanson Buick, Inc. v. Chatham, 163 Ga. App. 127, 129, 292 S.E.2d 428, 430

(1982).
131. See Williams v. ARA Environmental Servs., Inc., 175 Ga. App. 661,334 S.E.2d 192
(1985) (Benham, J., dissenting).
132. Odom v. Transamerica Ins. Group, 148 Ga. App. 156, 251 S.E.2d 48 (1928).

133. General Accident. & Fire Ins. Co. v. Sturgis, 136 Ga. App. 260, 221 S.E.2d 51
(1975).
134. Zamora v. Coffee General Hosp., 162 Ga. App. 82, 85, 290 S.E.2d 192, 194 (1985).
135. Id.
136. 215 Ga. App. 136, 449 S.E.2d 645 (1994).
137. Id. at 136, 449 S.E.2d at 646.
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employment,"' s The employer appealed, arguing that Bailey was not
found in a place where he reasonably should have been and that his
death did not arise from his employment 3 9 The court of appeals
rejected both arguments, noting that not only was Bailey found in a
place where he might reasonably be expected in the performance of his
duties, but the precipitating causative factor was, in fact, unknown. The
employer's contention that Bailey died because he left his car running
in an enclosed garage could be reached only by drawing certain
inferences from circumstantial evidence. In addition to the fact that the
AIJ, as the fact finder, rejected these inferences, the court of appeals
went on to say that mere inferences are not sufficient to overcome
the
140
presumption, which can be rebutted only by competent evidence.
B.

Any Evidence

The question of whether a physical condition is work-related is clearly
one for the State Board. In J&L Foods v. Brooks,' the Board found
that the claimant's carpal tunnel syndrome was not related to her
employment. Because there was evidence in the record to support such
a finding, the superior court was without authority to reverse even
though Brooks was supported by one physician who related the condition
to her work."4
It is a well settled principle that the superior court
does not have the authority to delve into the record and weigh evidence. 43
In the event evidence is stipulated as being undisputed before the
Board, and a finding is made based on that stipulation, the superior
court may reverse only if there is "precedential law that under identical
evidence a certain legal conclusion, or 'legal inference'. . . is demanded
..4As with any findings of fact by the Board, the any evidence
rule will be applied to stipulated facts. Thus, and if nothing else, the
court's decision in Hughes alerts practitioners to be cautious when
stipulating to certain facts at the evidentiary hearing.

138. Id. at 137, 447 S.E.2d at 646.
139.

Id.

140, Id. at 138, 449 S.E.2d at 648.
141.

214 Ga. App. 438, 448 S.E.2d 19 (1995).

142. Id. at 438, 448 S.E.2d at 20.
143. Howard Sheppard, Inc. v. Howard, 137 Ga. App. 224, S.E.2d 65 (1976).
144. Conquest Carpet Mills, Inc. v. Hughes, 215 Ga. App. 400,400,450 S.E.2d 865,866
(1994).

1995]

C.

WORKERS' COMPENSATION

Appeals

As seen in Fulton County Board of Workers' Compensation u.
Robinson,"' the sixty day rule as set forth in O.C.G.A. section 34-9105(b) continues to plague appellants at the superior court level. Fulton
County timely appealed a decision from the State Board. 46 At a
hearing set within sixty days of the appeal, the employee moved for
recusal of the superior court judge, who four days later, granted the
motion and continued the matter for an additional "90 days, through and
including 18 December 1993, to allow for another judge to be assigned
to hear the case."147 When it was finally heard on November 1, 1993,
the employee moved to dismiss the appeal on the grounds that the
Board's decision was affirmed by operation of law. The superior court
The court of appeals, however,
agreed and dismissed the appeal. 4
reversed, holding that the continuance by the initial judge "through and
was sufficient to meet the "date certain"
including" December 18, 1993
1 49
requirement of the statute.
If an issue is not raised before the Board, but could have been, it
cannot be raised at the superior court level to seek a reversal or remand.
In Craig u. Red Lobster Restaurant,5 ' the employer/insurer contended
that the employee's psychological problems were not causally related to
the accident. The Board found otherwise, and awarded the employee
psychological treatment. 1 ' While on appeal to the superior court, the
employer/insurer raised another defense, which was that the treatment
was unauthorized since the employee failed to use the procedures for a
change of physician.'5 2 The superior court remanded the claim for a
of apdetermination on this issue, but was reversed by the court
54
peals. 53 The issue should have been raised before the Board.
D. Attorney Fees
Although representing an injured employee can certainly be a
rewarding experience, it has its problems, one of which is termination

145.
146.
147.
148.

215 Ga. App. 378, 450 S.E.2d 850 (1994).
Id. at 380, 450 S.E.2d at 850.
Id.
'Id.

149. Id. at 379, 450 S.E.2d at 851.
150. 214 Ga. App. 829, 449 S.E.2d 307 (1994).
151. Id. at 829, 449 S.E.2d at 308.

152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
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by the client. Unfortunately, this may come after the attorney has
performed substantial work while handling the file. In Gleaton v.
Hazelwood Farms, Inc.,' the original attorney was discharged after
he obtained an offer of $15,000 to settle the claim. The employee then
hired a second attorney, who eventually settled the matter for $30,000,
which provided for a fee of $10,000. Although the second attorney
attempted to resolve the fee dispute with his counterpart by way of
correspondence, no reply was received.'5 6 The stipulated agreement
which was submitted to the Board not only disclosed the identity of the
first attorney, but it provided for a division of the fees by binding
agreement. In the event no agreement could be reached between
counsel, the attorney fees were to be held in escrow until such time as
a decision could be reached by the Board. The Appellate Division
eventually split the fee, awarding both attorneys $5,000. The superior
court reversed, apparently awarding the second attorney the entire fee.
The court of appeals thereafter reversed the superior court, holding that
the determination of a reasonable value of services was a finding of fact
and, therefore, subject to the any evidence rule.'57 The court distinguished those instances in which prior counsel was unaware of the
settlement and was denied an opportunity to object from instances in
which the issue of attorney fees was not specifically addressed in the
settlement papers. 5 '
E.

Change in Condition

In recent years, workers' compensation cases dealing with change in
condition' 59 issues have focused on the burden of proof required by
both claimants and employers. The 1994-95 survey period continued
this trend.
Claimant's Burden of Proof. Perhaps the most significant "change
in condition" case during the survey period was Richardson v. Dennis,
Corry, Porter & Thornton,' which established a significant exception
to the claimant's burden of proof. In recent cases, the court has emphasized that when a claimant is injured at work, receives workers'
compensation disability benefits, returns to work, and later seeks a
resumption of disability benefits, he bears the burden of proof to show

155.
156.
157.
158.

214 Ga. App. 825, 449 S.E.2d 170 (1994).
Id. at 825, 449 S.E.2d at 171.
Id. at 826, 449 S.E.2d at 171.
Id.

159. See O.C.G.A. § 34-9-104(a).
160. 216 Ga. App. 476, 454 S.E.2d 643 (1995).
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a change in condition, and must specifically show that he has diligently
sought suitable employment but was not hired due to the compensable
disability.1 6' In Richardson, the claimant, an investigator for a law
firm, injured her knee in the course of her employment, returned to work
two months later, but then left work again when her knee condition
worsened.'62 The claimant was ultimately diagnosed with underlying
rheumatoid arthritis exacerbated by her knee injury, and it was found
by the administrative law judge that the claimant's arthritic episodes
prevented her from working at any job and were the basis for her
resigning her job with the law firm. 6' The administrative law judge
and the full board awarded disability benefits, but the superior court
reversed, finding that the claimant failed to meet her burden of proof to
show a change in condition in that she had not shown a diligent job
search for suitable employment."'
The court of appeals reversed, finding that its earlier cases do not
require the claimant to demonstrate a search for work if the claimant is
totally disabled: "where an employee, such as appellant, returns to work
but subsequently becomes totally disabled due to circumstances related
to the earlier work injury, proof of these circumstances satisfies
employee's burden to show a change of condition and authorizes an
award of compensation."'6 5 The key distinction, therefore, is simply
whether or not the claimant is totally or partially disabled when
attempting to prove a change in condition. If only partially disabled, the
claimant must still demonstrate a diligent search for suitable employment, and that the claimant was not hired because of restrictions from
the on-the-job injury. However, if the claimant is totally disabled from
any job, the claimant need not prove what would obviously be a futile job
search.
The burden to demonstrate a diligent job search applies regardless of
whether the claimant is seeking temporary total or temporary partial

161. See Aden's Minit Market v. Landon, 202 Ga. App. 219,413 S.E.2d 738 (1991); Evco
Plastics v. Burton, 200 Ga. App. 121, 407 S.E.2d 60 (1991); Brown v. Georgia Power Co.,
181 Ga. App. 500, 352 S.E.2d 818 (1987). Practitioners should note, however, that since
the initial draft of this Article the requirement that the employee show he was not
subsequently hired because of his physical condition was deleted. On October 16, 1995, the
supreme court specifically overruled Landon,supra. See Maloney v. Gordon County Farms,
Inc., 265 Ga. 825,462 S.E.2d 606 (1995).
162. Richardson v. Dennis, Corry, Porter & Thornton, 216 Ga. App. at 476, 454 S.E.2d
at 644.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 477, 454 S.E.2d at 644.
165. Id.

428

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47

disability benefits. In Gilbert/Robinson v.Meyers, 6' the claimant
sustained work-related injuries to his back and left wrist, received
temporary total disability benefits, and returned to work with another
employer as a food salesman, making less money than his job as head
chef, the position he held when he was injured. 6 7 When the claimant
was fired from his sales job for lack of production, the claimant sought
a resumption of his temporary total disability benefits. The administrative law judge, however, found that subsequent to his termination from
the sales job, the claimant had neither worked nor looked for work. 6"
As a result, the claim for additional disability benefits was denied, and
although the full board affirmed this decision, the superior court
reversed, remanding the case for a determination of whether the
claimant's termination from.his job as a food salesman was related to his
compensable injury.6 9
The court of appeals reversed the decision of the superior court,
finding that "whether or not the lack of production was due in part or in
whole to any compensable disability during this period of employment
is not determinative of [claimant's] right to resumption of benefits
following the termination." 70 The court held that it was the claimant's burden of proof to show that, following his termination, he had
made a diligent job search and was unable to find employment because
of the physical restrictions from his compensable injury. 71 The court
noted that although some of its previous cases 17 involved claims for
resumption of temporary total disability benefits, the requirement of a
diligent job search is equally applicable where the request is for
resumption of temporary partial disability benefits. 7 '
The case of Dasher v. City of Valdosta, 7 4 points out that the claimant's burden of proof in a change in condition case is different than the
claimant's burden of proof to show disability from an original accident.1 75 Dasher was employed by the City of Valdosta and sustained
a work-related aggravation to a pre-existing back condition on April 22,
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169.
170.
171.
172.
Plastics
173.
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175.

214 Ga. App. 510, 448 S.E.2d 246 (1994).
Id. at 511, 448 S.E.2d at 247.
Id.
Id. at 511-12, 448 S.E.2d at 247.
Id. at 512, 448 S.E.2d at 247.
Id. at 511, 448 S.E.2d at 247.
Aden's Minit Market v. Landon, 202 Ga. App. 219, 413 S.E.2d 738 (1991); Evco
v. Burton, 200 Ga. App. 121, 407 S.E.2d 60 (1991).
214 Ga. App. at 511, 448 S.E.2d at 247.
217 Ga. App. 351, 457 S.E.2d 259 (1995).
Id. at 352-53, 457 S.E.2d at 261.
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1992.176 This accident occurred only two days before the city landfill
at which Dasher worked was closed, and Dasher's position eliminated.
Before the accident, Dasher had already decided to retire rather than
accept a comparable position at another landfill at a reduced salary. 7 7
Dasher performed his regular duties for the two days between his
accident and the date the landfill closed, and subsequently worked in his
own landscaping business, performing virtually the same kind of work
as he did at the city landfill.7 8 When Dasher filed a claim for total
disability benefits, the administrative law judge concluded that he had
not shown an inability to procure remunerative employment suitable to
his impaired capacity and therefore had not met his burden of proof to
show disability from the original work-related injury. 7 9 On appeal,
the court of appeals held that it was the claimant's burden of proof to
show by a preponderance of the evidence that he experienced a "loss of
earning capacity due to the injury and not due to the employee's
unwillingness to work or to the economic conditions of unemployment.""s Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
employer, which prevailed before the board, the court of appeals found
that there was sufficient evidence to find that the claimant had not met
his burden of proof to show disability.'' Practitioners should note,
however, that unlike a claimant's burden of proof in a change in
condition case, proof of disability following a compensable injury does not
appear to specifically require a search for suitable employment. Having
to prove, however, a loss of earning capacity due to the injury and not
the employee's unwillingness to work or to economic conditions may
make this a distinction without a difference.
Employer's Burden of Proof. Frequently, confusion occurs as to
whether it is the employer or the claimant who bears the burden of proof
to show a change in condition. This was the case in Drake v. LaRue
Construction Co.'82 Drake sustained an injury while employed as a
manual laborer on a construction site, resulting in a fractured skull and
dislocated shoulder."s The employer unilaterally suspended benefits
on the ground that Drake returned to work with a different employer,

176. Id. at 351, 457 S.E.2d at 260.
177. Id. at 352, 457 S.E.2d at 260.
178. Id.
179. Id., 457 S.E.2d at 261.
180. Id. at 352-53, 457 S.E.2d at 261 (citing Scandrett v, Talmadge Farms, 174 Ga.
App. 547, 330 S.E.2d 772 (1985)).
181. Id.
182. 215 Ga. App. 453, 451 S.E.2d 792 (1994).
183. Id. at 453, 451 S.E.2d at 793.

430

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47

but at the hearing, it was determined that Drake had actually not
returned to work."& The administrative law judge correctly characterized the claimant's request for additional income benefits as a change in
condition, but apparently placed the burden of proof on the claimant
based upon Drake's additional assertion that he was disabled from
psychological problems related to the injury." The employer denied
that claimant's psychiatric problems were work-related, and asserted
8
that they pre-existed the compensable injury."
As the court of appeals correctly pointed out, there were actually two
issues presented in this case: whether the claimant had undergone a
change in condition from his original injury,1 7 and whether or not his
psychiatric problems were related to the compensable injury." Given
the finding that Drake had not returned to work, the burden of proof to
show a change in condition was on the employer, not the claimant.'
It was therefore the employer's burden to show that the claimant was
completely recovered from his physical injuries or had suitable employment available to him.'" The claimant bore the burden of proof on the
separate issue of whether his psychiatric problems were causally related
to the compensable injury. Practitioners should remember that the
burden of proof in change in condition cases is dictated by whether or
not the claimant has returned to work. 9" If so, it is the claimant who
bears the burden of proof to show a change in condition, if not it is the
employer who bears the burden.
The employer's burden of proof to show a change in condition remains
even if the claimant has undergone a non-work-related supervening
accident. 92 In White v. Nantucket Industries,'93 the claimant sustained a work-related wrist injury, returned to work as a sitter for an
elderly woman, and was paid temporary partial disability benefits given
the fact that she was making less money as a sitter than at her preinjury job. 9 4 Subsequently, however, the claimant fell and broke her
leg in a non-work-related accident.9" Following the injury to her leg,
184. Id.
185. Id. at 454, 451 S.E.2d at 793.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 455, 451 S.E.2d at 794.
189. Id. at 454-55, 451 S.E.2d at 793. See Cornell-Young v. Mentor, 168 Ga. App. 325,
309 S.E.2d 159 (1983).
190. 215 Ga. App. at 454-55, 451 S.E.2d at 793.
191. Id.
192. White v. Nantucket Indus., 214 Ga. App. 542, 448 S.E.2d 278 (1994).
193. 214 Ga. App. 542, 448 S.E.2d 278 (1994).
194. Id. at 542-43, 448 S.E.2d at 278.
195. Id. at 543, 448 S.E.2d at 278.
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the claimant sought continuation of the temporary partial disability
benefits she received from her previous employer, but the employer
argued that the claimant bore the burden of proof to demonstrate a
change in condition.1
Although the state board and superior court denied benefits, the court
of appeals reversed, finding that it was the employer who bore the
burden of proof in this matter, not the claimant.197 Even though the
claimant had returned to work, the employer bore the burden of proof as
it was attempting to demonstrate that the claimant's disability was
actually the result of a supervening accident. In such instances, as the
court pointed out, the employer must demonstrate that the original
compensable disability has resolved and no longer accounts for the
claimant's disability.
F

Coverage

Although coverage questions are rare, they are presented to the Board
on occasion. In Ponderosa Collections, Inc. v. Frady,9 ' the employer's
workers' compensation insurance expired when the premium payment
for another full period was not made. Although notice was sent, the
employer denied receiving it.199 The Board found that there was no
coverage2' and was affirmed by the superior court. 1 On appeal,
the employer argued that in addition to the fact that there was a mutual
departure from the terms of the policy, coverage should be afforded since
it failed to receive notice of the non-renewal. 2 2 The court of appeals
was unpersuaded. The fact of the matter was that the employer did fail
to make the premium payment and, as a result, coverage simply expired
at the end of the scheduled policy period. Because the policy expired, no
notice of cancellation was required.20"
G.

Exclusive Remedy

Borrowed Servants. The court of appeals re-affirmed the strength
of the exclusive remedy doctrine for employers using employees on loan

196. Id., 448 S.E.2d at 278-79.
197. Id., 448 S.E.2d at 279.
198. 216 Ga. App. 619, 455 S.E.2d 346 (1995).

199.
200.
201.
202.

Id. at 619, 455 S.E.2d at 347.
Id. at 620, 455 S.E.2d at 347.
Id.
Id.

203. Id. at 621, 455 S.E.2d at 348.
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from a temporary agency in Coca-Cola Co. v. Nicks.2' In Nicks, the
employee stepped into an uncovered manhole on the sidewalk as she was
leaving her job. She had been working for several months as an
employee on loan from a temporary agency. She settled her workers'
compensation claim for $20,000 then filed a premises liability action
against Coke and the City of Atlanta. 5 The court held that
[an employee, working as a borrowed servant, may recover for injuries
sustained in connection with his work from either his general or special
employer, or in some instances, both. Such recovery, however, is
limited to those benefits available under workers' compensation law.
A plaintiff may not recover compensation benefits from one of the
employers
and maintain an action against the other employer in
26
tort. 0

Thus, as a borrowed servant, the employee's sole remedy was in workers'
compensation.0 7
Delays in Medical Care.
The court also clarified its prior
decision in Jim Walter Homes, Inc. v. Roberts,0 5 which suggested that
a refusal to authorize medical treatment may give rise to a common law
cause of action in tort, effectively carving out a new exception to the
exclusive remedy doctrine.0 9 In Dutton v. GeorgiaAssociated General
Contractors Self-Insurers Trust Fund,21 ° the court of appeals affirmed
the dismissal of an employee's tort action against the employer-insurer
in a "conspiratorial tort action" for an "outrageous, willful and wanton
...

scheme to deprive [the employee] of medical treatment and

benefits."211 Jim Walter Homes involved an intentional physical injury
resulting from a refusal to authorize treatment and arose from a default
judgment in which the allegations of the complaint were established as
fact.2 12 In Dutton, the court relied upon established precedent from
the Georgia Supreme Court to hold that "[aill refusals to pay are

204. 215 Ga. App. 381, 450 SE.2d 838 (1994).
205. Id. at 381-82, 450 S.E.2d at 838.
206. Id. at 382, 450 S.E.2d at 839.

207. Id. Note that O.C.G.A. § 34-9-11(c) has been amended to specifically address
leased employee and temporary employee situations. See supra text accompanying notes
69-73. The 1995 legislation may no longer require a "borrowed servant" analysis in this

context.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.

196 Ga. App. 618, 396 S.E.2d 787 (1990),
Id. at 621, 396 S.E.2d at 789-90; see also Bagley et al, supra note 9, at 545-46.
215 Ga. App. 607, 451 S.E.2d 504 (1994).
Id. at 607, 451 S.E.2d at 505.
196 Ga. App. at 619, 396 S.E.2d at 788.
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intentional acts and the wrongful refusal to pay and remedy therefor are
provided for by the Georgia Workers' Compensation Act."21
Co-Employee Impleader. Although the exclusive remedy doctrine
precludes an employee from suing an employer or co-employee directly
in this context, 4 it does not prevent a co-employee from being impleaded into an employee's action against a third party. In Brown v.
Weller,"5 while on the way to an employer-sponsored seminar, the
plaintiff was rear-ended. A co-employee was riding with the defendant
to the seminar. After being sued, the defendant brought the co-employee
into the suit by impleader."6 The court of appeals allowed the thirdparty complaint, even though the defendant and co-employee had
received workers' compensation benefits.217
Intentional Acts. In Macy's South, Inc. v. Clark,"' an assistant
buyer for Macy's was assaulted and raped in a Macy's parking garage
located across the street from the downtown store. She was attacked
within fifteen minutes from leaving the store. Clark filed a premises
liability suit against Macy's, and Macy's claimed the action was barred
by the exclusive remedy provision of the Workers' Compensation
Act.219 The court of appeals determined that the injury arose out of
and in the course of Clark's employment.2 20 Clark was required to
work downtown and chose to work late on the night of the attack.2 2'
The garage was maintained by Macy's and Clark parked her car there
because she received an employee discount rate.222 There was a causal
connection between the employment and the injury, and the injury
occurred within a reasonable period of egress from the workplace.223
Therefore, Clark's action in tort against Macy's was barred because of
the exclusive remedy provision of the Act.

213. 215 Ga. App. at 608, 451 S.E.2d at 506.
214. See Sargent v. Blankmann, 202 Ga. App. 156, 157, 413 S.E.2d 495, 496 (1991).

215.
216.
217.
218.

217 Ga. App. 67, 456 S.E.2d 602 (1995).
Id. at 67-68, 456 S.E.2d at 602.
Id. at 68, 456 S.E.2d at 603.
215 Ga. App. 661, 452 S.E.2d 530 (1994).

219.

Id. at 662, 452 S.E.2d at 531.

220. Id. at 663, 452 S.E.2d at 532.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223.

Id. at 664, 452 S.E.2d at 532.

224. Id., 452 S.E.2d at 533.
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Actions of Service Providers. In Smart Professional Photocopy
Corp. u. Dixon,22 the injured employee ordered certain medical reports
from her treating physician and the reports were provided by Smart
Professional Photocopy. The employee was billed more than allowable
under the rules and regulations of the State Board of Workers' Compensation and she brought a civil suit against Smart Professional Photocopy.226 The court held that Smart was a "service provider" within the
meaning of O.C.G.A. section 34-9-205(a),227 and as such, Dixon's
remedy would be to assert her rights under the schedule of fees for
physicians and surgeons and pharmaceuticals for services rendered
under the Georgia Workers' Compensation law as well as any penalties
which may be due under O.C.G.A. sections 34-9-21 and 34-9-18.228
H. Farm Labor
"Farm laborers" are exempted from the Act. 2 9 However, because
Georgia has a great deal of agriculture, the question of who is a farm
laborer is a significant one. In Lumber City Egg Marketers, Inc. u.
Piercy,23 the employer had an egg farm and a processing plant, both
of which were located on the same property, but were separate operations. The egg farm consisted of chicken houses, cattle, and hay
fields."' 1 The ALJ found that Piercy worked on the farm and, in fact,
was shoveling manure when injured. After the injury he did some work
at the egg processing plant. However, it was only after the injury that
Lumber City reported him as an agricultural worker.232
The AJ awarded benefits, holding that Lumber City was "not
primarily in the business of farming and the designation of Piercy as a
farm laborer was primarily for accounting purposes." 3 Focusing on
the business activities of Lumber City, the AJ found that Piercy was
not a full-time farm laborer under the Act, and therefore, the exemption
did not apply.'
The court of appeals disagreed with the focus of the
inquiry, holding that it is the "status of the employee, not the total

225. 216 Ga. App. 825, 456 S.E.2d 233 (1995).
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.

Id. at 825, 456 S.E.2d at 234.
Id. at 827, 456 S.E.2d at 235.
Id., 456 S.E.2d at 236.
O.C.G.A. § 34-9-2(a) (1992).
217 Ga. App. 584, 458 S.E.2d 364 (1995).
Id. at 585, 458 S.E.2d at 364-65.
Id., 458 S.E.2d at 365.
Id.
Id.
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activities of the employer." 5 According to the court of appeals, the
definition of farm laborer can be quite broad, not only including those
who raise livestock, but those who raise chickens as well.2"' Furthermore, it would not cease even though the employee might be doing
something incidental to the farming.237 It went on to frame the issue
as being "whether an employee performs some other duties retains his
general character as a farm or non-farm laborer; the character of the
work does not change with every temporary assignment."'
The case
was remanded for a factual determination as to whether the general
character of Piercy's work was non-farm labor.23 9
I. Independent Contractor
Both of the cases involving the issue of independent contractor versus
employee involved individuals who drove for a living. In Pitts v. Gopher
Courier Service,240 the employee was injured while delivering a package. The employer sought to have the claim denied on the grounds that,
as a matter of law, Pitts was an independent contractor because he was
an "owner/operator" under O.C.G.A. section 34-9-1(2).241

The ALJ

rejected the defense, awarding benefits.242 The Full Board reversed,
finding that the Code section applied.2" The superior court, however,
reversed and remanded, directing the Full Board to make further
findings of fact and conclusions of law.2' The court of appeals reviewed O.C.G.A. section 40-2-87, which defines owner/operator, and
O.C.G.A. section 40-2-88, which provides for the registration of certain
commercial vehicles used in interstate commerce, both of which can be
found in Article 3(A), Chapter 2, Title 40, Reciprocal Agreements for
Registration of Commercial Vehicles. Because there was no evidence
indicating that Pitts, who reportedly drove his vehicle locally, was an
"owner-operator" under O.C.G.A. section 40-2-87(19), the case was
remanded for a determination on this issue. 45

235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241,
242.
243.

Id.
Id. at 586, 458 S.E.2d at 365.
Id.
Id.
Id.
216 Ga. App. 219, 453 S.E.2d 505 (1995).
Id. at 220-21, 453 S.E.2d at 507.
Id. at 221, 453 S.E.2d at 507.
Id.

244. Id.
245. Id.
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In Williams v. Thurston Paulk, Inc.,246 the employee was hired
primarily as an independent contractor to drive a truck. However, in
addition to driving, he performed certain other duties. Evidence in the
record revealed that he took company vehicles to be fueled, delivered
trailers to tire shops for service, and routinely performed the mechanical
work.24 Williams testified that he considered himself to be an employee, and was injured while repairing a company truck.24 8 According to
the court, "even if Williams was not working at Paulk's specific behest
when he was injured, the record shows that he was doing so with
Paulk's permission, consent, and in furtherance of Paulk's business."24 9
The finding that Williams was an employee at the time of his injury was
supported by evidence, and, therefore, the award of benefits was
upheld. "5
J.

Medical Evidence
Drake v. LaRue Construction Co.251 merits a brief discussion in this
section not for the outcome in terms of the final decision but for an
evidentiary ruling. More and more accidents involve head injuries,
which are being treated by a relatively new specialty, neuropsychology.
In a 1992 decision, the Georgia Supreme Court held that a neuropsychologist was not qualified to testify as an expert with respect to causation
of psychological problems.25
Morris was legislatively overruled
effective July 1, 1993.253 In Drake, the law became effective between
the time the ALJ heard the case and the appeals to the Appellate
Division and superior court, the latter of which held that the testimony
was inadmissible.2" The court of appeals reversed, holding that the
superior court should have applied the law as it existed "at the time of
its judgment rather than the law prevailing at the rendition of judgement under review."255 Practitioners should take note of this evidentiary change.

246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.

216 Ga. App. 621, 455 S.E.2d 132 (1995).
Id. at 622, 455 S.E.2d at 133.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 622-23, 455 S.E.2d at 133.
215 Ga. App. 453, 451 S.E.2d 792 (1994).
Chandler Exterminators, Inc. v. Morris, 262 Ga. 257, 416 S.E.2d 277 (1992).
O.C.G.A. § 43-39-1 (1994).
215 Ga. App. at 454, 451 S.E.2d at 793.
Id. at 455, 451 S.E.2d at 794.
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K. Medical Treatment
If there is one area which spawns more disputes than any other in the
workers' compensation system, it has to be control over the medical
providers. Employers and insurers are afforded the right to designate
a medical provider by posting a panel of physicians, a conformed panel,
or a managed care organization, by making the employees aware of the
posted panel, and by ensuring that the injured employee is adequately
treated by accepting liability and providing treatment.256 If liability
is contested, then the employee is free to choose a physician. 57 Many
employees have taken the position that if the employer fails on any of
these requirements, it loses all control over the medicals for the duration
of the claim. As seen in Wright v. Overnite TransportationCo.," this
is not the case. In Wright, there was an initial hearing in which the
Board found that the employer failed to explain the posted panel to the
employee and, therefore, held that it was responsible for treatment
rendered by the employee's own physician. At that point, the employer
began to pay for the physician's services.259 The employee attempted
to change for a second time and, as with the first, without Board approval.2"' The Board held that he could do so, but the superior court and
court of appeals ruled otherwise. The employee was required to follow
Board procedures for changing physicians, and his failure to do so
rendered the second physician unauthorized.26 The reason behind the
decision was that the employer was providing treatment at the time the
employee attempted to change.262 Had it failed in this regard, then the
employee 26 3would have been free to change without seeking Board
approval.

L. Newly Discovered Evidence
The Appellate Division is authorized to "remand to a single member
or administrative law judge any case before it ... for the purpose of

taking additional evidence for consideration by the board in rendering

256.

O.C.G.A. § 34-9-201(1992 & Supp. 1994); Boaz v. K-Mart, 254 Ga. 707,334 S.E.2d

167 (1985).
257. Board Rule 201(e).
258. 214 Ga. App. 822, 449 S.E.2d 167 (1994).

259. Id. at 822, 445 S.E.2d at 168.
260. Id.
261. Id. at 823, 445 S.E.2d at 169.

262, Id.
263. Id.
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any decision or award in the case."'
The Board's rules state that it
shall "apply the law of Georgia regarding the tenure and character of
2 65
newly discovered evidence required for the granting of a new trial."
In Old Dominion Freight Line, Inc. v. Anthony," the employee
suffered an injury to his foot. The claim was accepted as compensable,
and benefits were subsequently terminated based on a return to work
release from the authorized treating physician.2 7 The ALJ ruled
against the employee at a change of condition hearing."" He appealed
to the Appellate Division, which entertained several requests for a
remand to the ALJ to take further evidence from specific medical
providers." 9 They were partially granted by the Appellate Division,
which, "relying heavily upon the evidence developed on remand,
substituted its decision for that of the administrative law judge,"
ordering the recommencement of total disability benefits.27 The court
of appeals, reviewing briefly the criteria for newly discovered evidence,
one of which being due diligence, held that the Appellate Division
erred.27 1 The contested evidence dealt with whether the employee
suffered from reflex sympathetic dystrophy, which was the subject of the
initial hearing before the AU2 . 2 This being the case, the employee
should not have been permitted to obtain a remand to the AUJ "for the
purpose of bolstering or extending his evidence on the question of
whether he suffered reflex sympathetic dystrophy."27 8 The matter was
then remanded to the Appellate Division with direction that it be
reconsidered after purging the improper evidence from the record.
M. Statutory Employer
If an employee suffers a compensable work-related injury, his recovery
against either his immediate employer or a statutory employer shall be
limited to those benefits granted under the Act.2 4 In Southern
Railway v. Hand,275 the railroad sought to reverse a liability judgment

264.
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.

O.C.G.A. § 34-9-103(a) (1992 & Supp. 1994).
Board Rule 103(c).
216 Ga. App. 267, 454 S.E.2d 574 (1995).
Id. at 267, 454 S.E.2d at 576.
Id.
Id.

270. Id.
271.

Id. at 268, 454 S.E.2d at 576.

272. Id.
273. Id.
274. O.C.G.A. § 34-9-11 (1992 & Supp. 1995); see also Wright Assocs., Inc. v. Rieder,
247 Ga. 496, 277 S.E.2d 41 (1981).

275. 216 Ga. App. 370, 454 S.E.2d 217 (1995).
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in favor of Hand by contending that he was a borrowed servant and, as
a result, that any recovery for his injury was limited to workers'
compensation benefits. Hand, an employee of Bankhead Maintenance
Company, was injured when he was working on Southern's rail line as
part of his job.27 Even though Hand
testified that (1)he received his daily work assignments from Southern
employees; (2) Southern employees took him to the job site on many
occasions, such as the day he was injured; (3) Southern employees
helped him unload the truck and prepare his work site; (4) Southern
employees could, if they needed to, move him to another job or move
him from a job; and (5) Southern employees could make him redo a job,
this was insufficient to find that he was a borrowed servant. 7 Hand's
testimony did not establish "both that Southern had the exclusive right
to discharge him, and that Bankhead had no control and direction over
him for the occasion at issue."27 8 Because these elements were missing, Southern
was not entitled to the exclusive remedy bar as set forth
279
in the Act.

N. Subsequent Injury Trust Fund
For years both the Board and practitioners have taken the position
that the Fund could not be held liable for assessment of fees regardless
of how unreasonable its actions might have been. In Muscogee Iron
Works v. Ward,2" the employer filed a claim for reimbursement, which
the Fund denied. The Appellate Division held that the denial was
unreasonable and assessed attorney fees. The Fund appealed, arguing
that O.C.G.A. section 34-9-367 barred such an award.28 1 In a six to
three decision, the court of appeals rejected the argument, holding that
the Code section only barred recovery of attorney fees by an employer
against the Fund when the fees were assessed because of the employer's
conduct in defending the claim brought by the employee. 2 The
supreme court reversed the court of appeals, holding that because
O.C.G.A. section 34-9-367 does not specifically authorize attorney fees in
"[Tihe
a proceeding for reimbursement, they cannot be upheld.'

276. Id. at 370, 454 S.E.2d at 218.
277. Id. at 371, 454 S.E.2d at 219.
278. Id.
279. Id.
280. 216 Ga. App. 636, 455 S.E.2d 363 (1995).
281. Id. at 636, 455 S.E.2d at 364.
282. Id. at 638, 455 S.E.2d at 365.
283. Georgia Subsequent Injury Trust Fund v. Muscogee Iron Works, No. S95G1066,
1995 WL 577515 (Ga. Oct. 2, 1995).
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public policy of this state is that [ attorney[] fees of an employer or
insurer are not recoverable from the Fund."2
VI.

CONCLUSION

If the past few survey periods are any indication, the questions left
unresolved by Georgia's appellate courts will continue to provide
opportunities for the State Board to take an active role in proposing
useful additions, and sometimes corrections, to the Act and Board Rules,
in consultation with the attorneys who practice before it. As with many
other practice areas reviewed in this volume, alternative dispute
resolution, mediation in particular, has brought many changes to the
every-day practice of workers' compensation law, especially in the
resolution of change of physician, attorney fees, and settlement issues.
On the whole, all of the state's decision-makers, including legislators, the
State Board, as well as judges on the trial courts and appellate courts,
appear to be committed to making the workers' compensation system
work effectively for employees and employers alike.

284. Id. at *2.

